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1 The Formula behind the Sum 
Rent-seeking companies are not aiming at increasing the quantity of capital services that their 
asset yields in certain period of time, but rather at investing in intangibles with the objective of 
gaining high returns in the future. In such cases the quantity is not really contributing to 
production or the economy. This causes such a company to posses so called monopoly rents, 
which are  gold to the company itself as well as to the stock market, but unfortunately the 
benefits do not necessarily extend to the national economy.1 Pharmaceutical companies are of 
such sort. They seek to invest in research and development (R&D) to gain high prices with 
possible future patented products during the patented lifecycle of their medicine. This causes 
controversy in the aspect of social welfare. Pharmaceutical companies are often seen as 
inhumane in their quest for high rents at the price of human lives and health. In the battle 
against monopoly rents, legislation on compulsory licensing has been devised.  
Compulsory licensing may be used by states to  disrupt abuse of a monopoly position, to 
prevent or stop other anti-competitive actions or to simply provide easier access to medication. 
Such compulsory licenses oblige the patent owner to license its patented medicine to another 
pharmaceutical company, often a producer of generic drugs. The issuing court may decide on a 
certain price for the license, i.e. a royalty payable to the patent owner, or it may condemn the 
patent to be licensed for free.  
The objective of this study is to answer the following sub-problems:  
- How is the value of pharmaceutical patents calculated? 
- What is the value of research and development for pharmaceutical companies? 
- How is  society affected by a compulsory license?  
Through these sub-problems I seek to resolve  what  all the factors to be taken into 
consideration in order to calculate a justifiable amount of royalties paid for compulsory 
licenses in Europe, are. The research is geographically restricted to Europe in order to limit the 
study merely to developed countries, hence bypassing the biggest ethical problem of patents that 
is present in least developed countries (LDC). Also, the United States is set aside, because of 
their heavy emphasis on the exclusive ownership of patents,  and lack of case law concerning 
compulsory licensing of medical patents. Moreover, the EU countries reflect  relatively 
homogenous legislation and economies.  
 
1 Comment by Jack E. Tirplett in Lev (2001), p. 192 
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2 The X in the Formula  
2.1 A Brief Look at  EU Legislation on Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licenses were originally created because individual intellectual property (IP) owners 
refused to license thei invention. It is an exception from the IP owner’s exclusive right and 
justifies the use of a protected right without the owner’s permission. Hence compulsory 
licensing is often described as a deep-inflected process, the use of which must be based on 
cogent reasons.2 Altogether the compulsory legislation in the EU is manifold, consisting of EU 
laws, EU courts’ decisions, and international obligations such as WTO’s TRIPS agreement. It 
is, however, not in the scope of this study to discuss the legislative sections to detail.3  
At its simplest, compulsory licensing can be divided into: 
1. Merger-related compulsory licensing, and 
2. Non-merger related compulsory licensing.  
The first is more commonly used, and not as controversial as the latter.4 In the TRIPS 
Agreement compulsory licensing is, on the other hand, divided into 1) patents licensed for 
domestic production, and 2) patents licensed for export to LDCs. TRIPS entered into force in 
1995, including the Articles on compulsory licensing to domestic markets. Compulsory 
licensing concerning export was added to the agreement in 2003 through the Doha 
Declaration.5 The then European Community and its member countries, in their own right, 
joined the WTO in January 1995, and hence became bound by its regulations, including the 
TRIPS Agreement and its regulations on compulsory licensing.6  
TRIPS does not list the reasons for which compulsory licensing may be used, but rather leaves 
this to the member countries’ discretion.7 However, the agreement does, in Article 31, list some 
conditions for the use of compulsory licensing. Most importantly it states that in order to apply 
 
2 Vilanka (2004) 
3 Therefore, only the most important facts will be introduced, while the reader is welcome to look  to the citations 
for more detailed information. 
4 Kanter (2006), p. 351 
5 TRIPS and Health 
6 WTO – Member Information 
7 TRIPS and Health 
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for a license, the person or company should on reasonable commercial terms have attempted to 
negotiate a voluntary license. Only if the negotiations for a voluntary license fail, a compulsory 
license is possible. It is also deemed that in case a compulsory license is issued, an adequate 
remuneration must be awarded to the patent holder:  
“The right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.” 
Moreover, according to the TRIPS Agreement the compulsory license cannot be exclusive to 
the licensee, i.e. the patent holder still retains the right to produce, sell and market the drug. 
The compulsory licensing should also be subject to legal review within the country.8  
In the European Union compulsory licensing is mostly used in merger-related cases concerning 
provisions on competition law.  In the interpretation of these provisions three important cases 
have added to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning 
compulsory licensing. Those cases are Magill,. 9After the IMS Health Case the national Court of 
Germany asked for clarification to the relevant competition law standards, to which the 
European Court of Justice responded in 2004. The court concluded that the denial to license 
one’s intellectual property right to a competitor asking for such a license, is not in itself an 
abuse of a dominant position, but will be considered abusive if the following factors are met:  
1. the refusal to license prevents the emergence of a new product, for which consumer 
demand exists; 
2. no objective consideration can justify the refusal; and 
3. the refusal provides the intellectual property owner with monopoly in the secondary 
markets of its intellectual property.10  
The Microsoft case, however, developed these circumstances. From Microsoft it followed that 1) 
the intellectual property right (IPR) needs only  realize the risk of eliminating competition, 
because of its necessity in the market, 2)the refusal to license may stifle innovation within the 
market, 3) and  the refusal cannot be objectively justified by taking into consideration the 
innovation level of the market as a whole, compared to the innovation level of the dominant 
firm. In all, the result of the Microsoft-case weakened the requirements necessary for issuing a 
compulsory licensing.11 Yet the EU Commission argues that evenin instances where these 
 
8 TRIPS Article 31 
9 Magill C-241/91P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, 1995 ECR I-743; C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. 
NDC Health GbH & Co. KG (2004); and COMP/37.792, Microsoft, March 2004 
10 C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GbH & Co. KG (2004) 
11 COMP/37.792, Microsoft, March 2004 
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circumstances are not met, every case is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and the refusal to 
license may be considered abusive.12 
EU member countries may in some cases have national legislative norms on compulsory 
licensing, but mostly member state legislation should nowadays be in harmony with the EU 
legislation as well as the international obligations, especially in the area of competition law and 
issues concerning the common market and their efficient functioning. In all, the area of 
compulsory licensing is, however, constantly evolving as a result of vivid debate and  
controversy. 
2.2 The Odd One Out, IPRs or Compulsory Licensing 
Viewpoints on compulsory licensing vary somewhat greatly, as does the reasoning for its 
necessity. However, as compulsory licensing might be thought of as an exception to  general 
intellectual property legislation, it is no surprise that, like most exceptions, it causes difference 
in opinions.  
The value of a patent or technology is a very subjective issue. Even to the extent that innovators 
do not necessarily understand the actual market value of their invention when being 
compulsorily licensed.13 The value of the patent perceived by the patent owner is not however 
the only problem. The possibility exists that by imposing compulsory licensing on 
pharmaceutical companies, the country in question reduces the company’s future incentives to 
invest in research and development and introduce new products to the market. Similarly, the 
country’s medicine authority’s duty of regulating the terms and quality of licensed products may 
become more difficult. The gathering of data on adverse events may become challenging. 
Moreover, such issues as enforcement of product recalls, informing on the correct use of 
products, as well as ensuring that licensed products are available for patients, may be affected.14  
On the other hand fears persist that strong protection of intellectual property rights will cause a 
price increase in pharmaceuticals, the decline of local pharmaceutical industries, inhibition of 
access to treatment for patients, and that investment in the country will not increase.15  As a 
result, compulsory licensing is sought  to resolve these fears. It is however, unsure whether it is 
strong IPR protection or compulsory licensing that causes more harm in the aforementioned 
areas.  
 
12 Katsoulacos (2008), p. 288 
13 Rozek (2000), p. 890 
14 Rozek (2000), p. 890-891 
15 Rozek (2000), p. 892 
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It is often thought that patent protection provides pharmaceutical companies with monopoly 
power. This is not however completely true. Instead of being provided with a monopoly 
position, pharmaceutical companies are for a limited time-period granted  the exclusive right to 
produce, sell and market products embodying a clearly-defined innovation. Therefore, only one 
treatment type with only a certain active ingredient is protected, whilst all other treatments are 
possible to produce. Conclusively, competition does not suffer as a mere result of patent 
protection.16 In general intellectual property protection does not have any effect on the prices 
of pharmaceuticals as long as therapeutic alternatives exist.17 However, if a pharmaceutical 
company has a  strong patent position, meaning that it possesses many interlinked patents, then 
competition may decrease as a result of no alternative treatment methods being free of patent 
protection.18 Similarly, the possibility exists that no other treatment method is possible for a 
certain disease, and that a patent protects the only possible one. In such cases competition 
could indeed be obscured and the patent owner have monopoly. Hence, pharmaceuticals with 
no therapeutic alternatives have higher prices than compared with prices of generic products  
lacking intellectual property protection. This however might be the cost of encouraging 
innovation and improving health care.19  
Some fears exist that strong IPR protection will result in success for only the largest companies, 
as smaller ones cannot afford to wait for the expiration of patents. Patents however encourage 
companies to innovate, as well as to make innovations public. As a result, when patents expire, 
generic companies have more innovations to copy than would be without the patent protection. 
Moreover, when patent laws were introduced in Italy, employment within the pharmaceutical 
sector grew faster than employment nationally. Similarly, pharmaceutical companies’ spending 
grew by over 300 per cent during 1978 and 1993, meaning that the effect of the patent 
protection might already have affected the GNP. In Canada a 269 per cent growth in the 
medical R&D employment was experienced as a result of changing the legislation from 
providing for compulsory licensing to protecting patents. The overall employment in the 
pharmaceutical industry in Canada grew by 35 per cent. Evidence also shows that 
pharmaceutical companies choose locations for their plants and other facilities based on the 
IPR environment of countries, hence having an effect on the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
injected into national economies.20 
Although IPRs protect local companies from foreign infringers within the domestic market, 
intellectual property legislation signals to foreign investors that the country recognizes the rights 
 
16 Rozek (2000), p. 892 
17 Rozek and Berkowitz (1998), p. 215-216 
18 Narin (1998), p. 71 
19 Rozek and Berkowitz (1998), p. 215-216 
20 Rozek (2000), p. 894-896 
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of foreign firms and that foreign investors may make strategic business decisions without  
government interference. Strong protection of intellectual property also indicates to investors 
that the country has a transparent legal system with unbiased application of commercial laws, as 
well as reduced corruption in government activities. Moreover, there is evidence to show that 
patents reflect the owning company’s position in the market. Therefore, the financial market 
and customers may infer from acquired or filed patents that the firm has strong market 
presence and may potentially gain dominant status. In addition, patents indicate strong R&D, 
productivity and innovation activity. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, translate patents to 
signals of a well-managed company that has defined a market niche for itself. As a result, a 
country’s FDI correlates with the strength of the country’s patent protection. If the country 
promotes compulsory licensing, investors and others observing the pharmaceuticals market may 
find this alarming and refrain from investing in that country.21 
It is often stated that strong IPRs restrict access to healthcare. One viewpoint is that as prices of 
pharmaceuticals rise less people can afford them. This might be true in countries where social 
security and welfare are not covered for by the government. One example could be that of the 
United States. However, in the European Union at least most member countries have a social 
security system that provides for the healthcare of citizens. In France for example all medication 
and doctor appointments are covered through various refund policies. Consequently, the 
medication consumption in France is probably higher than  necessary. Therefore, in countries 
where social welfare exists the prices of pharmaceuticals cannot be the mere reason for 
improper access to healthcare.  
As a result of market factors and legislative factors, prices of pharmaceuticals vary between 
countries. These prices are a result of market forces and legislation. Adifference in prices may 
cause parallel importation. Pharmaceutical companies strictly control their own product exports 
and imports so as to prevent parallel imports from lower priced countries to higher priced 
countries. Compulsory licensing enhances this problem. When a patented pharmaceutical is 
compulsorily licensed, the price of the product decreases. Not only is the patent owner 
incapable of controlling the quality of the licensed products, but also incapable of supervising 
parallel trade. As a result countries with compulsory licensing laws may receive products later 
than those without such laws as pharmaceutical companies do not want to create additional 
sources of supply in countries where they may be imported elsewhere. Hence, consumers are in 
the end the ones to suffer.22  
Moreover, the cost of regulation increases, as the final quality control of the licensee’s products 
is dependent on government inspection, since pharmaceutical companies no longer have as 
 
21 Bird and Cahoy (2008), p. 297-298 
22 Rozek (2000) p. 898-899 
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strong an incentive to invest in reputation or distribute information to healthcare providers, 
since licensees would be able to free-ride.23 Nevertheless, the patent owner is likely to produce 
the same drug for at least some markets, including the market where a compulsory license has 
been issued, which means that the patent owner will still have to  comply with the minimum 
requirements of drug control and providing information to health care providers. 
The fact that licensees are not familiar with the research that resulted in the innovated drug 
may cause patients, physicians, pharmacists and payers to receive inaccurate information about 
the drug. This in turn increases the necessity for adequate consumer protection laws.24 
Altogether, in considering whether to utilize compulsory licensing various values and priorities 
need to be weighed, and while it may have some benefits some problems may arise as well. 
3 The Value of Intangible Assets 
The chart below exemplifies the basic nature of intangibles. Economic benefit increases only 
moderately at low levels of ownership, while the curve takes a steep rise at complete or near to 
complete ownership. This means that at full ownership the possibilities of economic benefits 
are unlimited. The unlimited economic benefits can be obtained through high prices, which are 
possible to maintain,  if full ownership exists. Hence, it may result in the previously mentioned 
rent monopoly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1 The Two Dimensions of Intangible Economic Benefits25 
 
23 Rozek and Rainey (2001), p. 471-472 
24 Rozek and Rainey (2001), p. 472 
25 Cohen (2005), p. 63 
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It is therefore clear that the issue of ownership and its value need to be inspected in more 
detail. The value of ownership is a two-faceted concept, where both the owned intangible asset 
and the research and development having led to the ownership play an essential role.  
3.1 How to Valuate Medicine Patents 
In order to calculate a justifiable sum for a royalty, it is more than necessary to evaluate the 
value of the patent being licensed. In the following three different methods for the valuation of 
patents, income, market and cost approach, will be described.  
3.1.1 The Income Approach 
The income approach is based on evaluating the value of an intangible asset today based on the 
cash flow or profit it will generate in the future. According to Cohen, the income approach 
works because of the following underlying financial principles: 
- Ceteris paribus, investors are more willing to pay greater amounts for investments that 
generate greater profits. 
- Ceteris paribus, time is money, i.e. the sooner the profits are generated the greater the 
investments can be. 
- Ceteris paribus, the smaller the risks of the cash flow, the bigger the investment.26  
The income approach then comprises of three steps, which are:  
1. “Identify the asset from which we are trying to derive economic benefit. 
2. Estimate the expected cash flows from that asset over time.  
3. Assign an appropriate measure of risk to our prediction.”27 
In the case of a medicine patent the first step is easy as the object is the patent in itself. What 
comes to the third step, on the other hand, the medicine patents in question, i.e. under the risk 
of being compulsorily licensed, are usually enjoying some sort of monopoly position within the 
market, and hence the biggest risks of cash flow are dangerous side-effects occurring or a 
competing product28 entering the market. It is then the third step that causes the most distress 
 
26 Cohen (2005), p. 74 
27 See Cohen (2005), p. 74 
28 Here note that a competing product would be another medicine with another active substance for the same 
disease or another therapeutic method.  
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with medicine patents. During the life cycle of the patent it is of course relatively easy to predict 
profits it generates as the patent owner defines the price of the product.29  However, after the 
expiration of the patent the cash flow becomes  Russian roulette, as the price of the drug may 
drop by 60% in result of generics entering the market.  
The formula for calculating the net present value of an intangible asset would be  
NPV= C0 + ∑ Ct/(1+rt)
t 
Where: NPV =  Net present value 
 C0 =  The negative cash flow of acquiring the asset 
 Ct =  The cash flow in period t 
  rt = The discount rate in period t, which describes the time and risk 
associated with the cash flow.30 
In valuating medicine patents, the initial cost of acquiring the product would therefore be the 
investment in R&D, as well as all production and marketing costs. The R&D costs may also be 
difficult to estimate, as they might not be product specific, i.e. many drugs are the sum of years 
and years of research, which in the beginning might have been for a somewhat different 
product.31 Also, the discount rate includes only the market risk, while project-specific risks are 
not incorporated in the above formula. This is the formula’s limitation as the cash flows with 
many intangible assets may fluctuate greatly, hence the project specific risk is not adequately 
important to take into account.32 Every medicine patent, as well, is a project of its own, with 
specific risks depending on the disease treated and differing possibilities of unexpected side 
effects arising. In its very simplest form the discount rate can be seen as the opportunity cost of 
investing in the specific medicine patent rather than in another medicine.33 Therefore, as the 
risk of compulsory licensing on a certain patent rises, so does the opportunity cost, and in 
result the discount rate applied to the net present value.   
 
29 No country specific medication pricing policies are taken into consideration. 
30 Cohen (2005), p. 75-76 
31 DiMasi et al. (2003) 
32 Cohen (2005), p. 77  
33 Cohen (2005), p. 77 
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3.1.2 The Market Approach 
According to the market approach an intangible asset can be valued on the basis of the value of 
a comparable asset on the market. In using the market approach in valuating medicine patents 
the problem is not in defining the market, but rather finding comparable assets, especially with 
patents under the threat of compulsory licensing. Therefore, the market approach works best 
for commodities, which can be relatively easily defined and are traded in an active market. The 
market approach permits us to evaluate the relative value of an asset through benchmarking, 
but assumes that the comparable assets are priced correctly. Moreover, the market approach 
evaluates the price of a product not the value of the actual patent.34 However, as the price 
generates cash flow from the patented product, the price of the product does give indication to 
the value of the underlying patent, as noted in the previous section. All these issues must be 
kept in mind when using the market approach for valuation of a pharmaceutical patent.  
In valuating a pharmaceutical patent with no generic equivalents through the market approach, 
the first step is to define the market, to discover the comparable. The market may be defined as 
all pharmaceutical patents, only patents with certain indication, patents for certain age groups 
or patents with a certain indication to a specific age group. If the valuated patent has no generic 
equivalent, the most specifically defined market may not have any comparable products to 
compare with. Therefore, the discovery of a comparable may demand  defining of a less specific 
market.35  
After discovering a comparable, it is necessary to evaluate the reason for a customer to pay more 
or less for your product in relevance to the comparable. History gives some indication to 
possible future success or failure, but not necessarily. The wider the scope of the drug the higher 
the price may be, but not necessarily. The price and value of a drug are also affected by the 
remaining life-time of the drug, e.g. if no significant generics are on the way, the life of the drug is 
longer. Moreover, the likeliness of infringement of the patent affects the pricing, and value. The 
likeliness of infringement can also be evaluated through the ownership and economic benefit 
graph dealt with earlier, as the greater the ownership, the less possibility there is for 
infringement. Conclusively, the price of a patented product may not be an accurate reflection 
of the comparable medicine, as many product specific issues affect the price36. In addition, it is 
a relevant issue whether a compulsory license can be considered as equal to an infringement. 
The action and the effects are relevantly same the only difference being that one is legal and the 
other is not.   If so, then the threat of compulsory licensing would already in itself affect the 
price of the product and the value of the patent, as the full ownership is threatened. 
 
34 Cohen (2005), p. 91-92 
35 Cohen (2005), p. 92 
36 Cohen (2005), p. 93-94 
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Chart 2 The Incentive to Appropriate an Intangible37 
 
As can be noted from the above chart the incentive to appropriate increases with the economic 
benefit. To some extent, with some precautions, the same happens with compulsory licensing. 
The greater the market share of a patented drug, the greater the profits, and hence, the greater 
the monopoly. The incentive to appropriate in the form of compulsory licensing increases as 
well, as improperly high profits from medicines are frowned upon. For example, in cases where 
the increased monopoly position is misused, the threat of compulsory licensing increases.  
In conclusion, the market approach does have its benefits, but may also be relatively difficult to 
use in the calculation of the value of medicine patents under the threat of compulsory 
licensing, as there may not exist any adequately comparable patented drugs and the price of the 
drug is affected by many different aspects. Also, in many EU countries authorities influence the 
final prices of drugs, meaning that the prices do not evolve according to the theory of demand 
and supply. Nonetheless, the market approach does give us useful insight to the price of a drug 
versus the value of the underlying patent, as well as to the incentives to appropriate. 
3.1.3 The Cost Approach 
The cost approach is the third method of valuating medicine patents. It is all about calculating 
the ratio of an asset’s cost and value. The cost approach consists of three different costs: the 
original cost, the book cost and the replacement cost. The original cost is the cost of acquiring or 
producing the patent, and is often the wrong one to use, as the cost of an asset almost always 
changes over time. Book cost, on the other hand, is everything that is written in the company’s 
 
37 See Cohen (2005), p. 95 
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financial statements. In consideration of pharmaceutical patents, the book cost’s accuracy in 
representing the patent’s real worth may depend on the following issues:  
1. If the patent has been incorporated into a new drug.  
2. Where in the European Medicines Agency’s (EMEA) or national authority’s approval 
process the drug stands. 
3. How successful the drug has been in sales. 
4. What is the prediction for competition and demand for the drug after the expiration of 
its patent. 
5. What is the patent’s age.  
Replacement cost is the cost of acquiring a replacement for the product. The cost of replacement 
is higher the higher the scarcity  of the product.38 This causing an interesting context for 
pharmaceutical patents, as the replacement cost of the product is very high during the patent’s 
lifespan, but after expiration the replacement cost may drop enormously, as the production of 
generics is relatively easy after the patent owner has performed the basic research and produced 
the patented drug. However, the replacement cost also indicates that if the value of the patent is 
the cost it would take to replace the drug, then in compulsory licensing the patent owner 
should be compensated with the amount necessary to replace the drug, i.e. the cost of 
developing and producing another drug as beneficial as the prior. Another possibility is that, 
since no adequatelypriced substitute is available, the patent owner will be compensated for lost 
profits.39  In conclusion, the value of a medicine patent can be evaluated by the transaction cost 
necessary to replace it, hence the more costly it is to replace the medicine patent the more 
valuable the patent is.   
Although the original cost may often be the wrong cost of an intangible to use in valuation, 
nonetheless it is not too far from correct with medicine patents, as usually the highest costs of a 
medicine patent are the initial costs of acquiring the patent. This meaning that the original cost 
will not be too low, but instead the value of the patent may depreciate during its lifespan, in 
which case the original cost would be too high. The book cost, on the other hand, may not be 
accurate enough for medicine patents because research and development as well as obtaining 
market approval are very long processes, hence connoting that firstly, not all costs might be 
found, and secondly not all costs can simply be allocated to a certain patent. It can therefore be 
concluded that the cost approach consists of three potential viewpoints, which however include 
the risk of inaccuracy.  
 
38 Cohen (2005), p. 109-112 
39 Cohen (2005), p. 112 
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3.1.4 Patent citations 
Patent citations (in subsequent patents) are used to justify the novelty of an invention. They are 
placed in a patent application to demonstrate the differences to prior innovations and to 
connote the boundaries of the application.40 However, patent citations are found to be industry 
specific and national. Interestingly enough, though, in the United States 73% of citations in 
patents are to publicly funded science, i.e. to university publications and research in 
government laboratories or otherwise government funded. Patent citations also reflect the time 
it takes for researchers to improve prior inventions. Countries where patent citations are often 
to recent studies, have shorter technology cycle times. This in turn suggests that the inventors of 
the specific country are better at incremental adaptation.41 Clearly patent citations indeed 
provide more information than one would immediately imagine. 
In fact another way of evaluating the value of a company’s patents is to look at the citations to a 
company’s patents in subsequent patent applications.42 It has been argued that calculating 
patent citations gives a more precise approximation of the economic value of inventive activity 
than unweighted patent counts or R&D expenditures.43 Such citations give an idea of the 
company’s research capabilities as well as the effects that the company’s research has on a wider 
scale than just the company itself. Moreover, studies suggest that the amount of patents granted 
in one year to a certain company, the amount of citations to the company’s patents in 
subsequent patent applications, and the amount of citations in the company’s own patents can 
be used to predict the stock returns and market-to-book values of a public company.44 These 
studies have of course targeted public companies, and therefore some precautions must be 
taken when reflecting the findings to private companies. Hall et al. have however since the 
1990s been studying the correlation between the number of patent citations and companies’ 
stock market value.45 
An average US drug or medicine patent in 1998 had six science citations. This rate is, however, 
increasing at tremendous speed. Patents that are adjudicated by courts as pioneering patents are 
usually cited five times more often than other patents.46 Narin (1998) suggests the probability 
that if patents are cited three times more often than the average, then the patent has 
technological and economical importance, which would be approximately 10 per cent of 
 
40 Harhoff et al. (1999), p. 511 
41 Narin (1998), p. 61-63 
42 Lev (2001), p. 59-60 
43 Harhoff et al. (1999), p. 511 
44 Lev (2001), p. 59-60 
45 Harhoff et al. (1999), p. 511; Hall et al. 
46 Narin (1998), p. 63-70 
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patents. Narin’s guess is not too far from the truth as Hall et al. proved that companies having 
two to three times the median number of citations per patent have a 35 per cent value 
premium, while patents being cited 20 times or more have a market value premium of 54 per 
cent. Pharmaceutical patents belong to the latter group.47  
Although market value of a company is not directly connected to the compensable value of a 
patent, it is connected indirectly. Pharmaceutical patents have an impact of over 50 per cent 
over the average on the company’s market value.48 Consequently, the market value (and stock 
prices) of the company rises with the value of the patents. Therefore, the more valuable a patent 
is perceived to be the more valuable it will become to the owner through increasing market 
value. Valuable patents, in a sense, increasingly generate their own value. In theory, however, 
this value should not be affected by compulsory licensing as the ownership of the patent still 
persists and the amount of citations is not affected.  
The problem that could evolve with patent citation valuation, if used in compulsory licensing 
decisions, is that of time. This means that, the age of the patent has an effect on the number of 
citations. If a compulsory license were awarded at an early stage of the patent’s lifecycle it might 
not yet be cited at all, which would even through methods of calculation give a future value of 
zero citations. Hence, a risk persists when estimating citations during the first years of the 
patent’s life cycle.49 However, as mentioned pharmaceutical patents often have more than 20 
cites per patent, which could suggest that they are cited consistently throughout their lifespan.  
3.2 The Value of Research 
One argument for the pharmaceutical companies’ ability to gain large profits with necessities 
such as medicine is that they need cash flow to invest in further R&D. Clearly then, this 
research has value that must be taken into consideration, if the generated profits are lowered as 
a result of compulsory licensing. The problem arises on how to measure this value.  
Hounshell (1998) strongly believes that calculating the return on investment (ROI) of R&D is 
highly problematic. He feels that it is not possible to measure ROI of R&D at the company 
level, the industry level or the national level, and if this is claimed done then the claimant is not 
in reality truly assessing the costs and benefits of R&D. The reason for such a strong viewpoint 
is that especially long-term research is highly uncertain while the benefits of research are 
 
47 Hall et al., p. 4 
48 Hall et al., p. 32 
49 Hall et al., p. 13-14 
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ambiguous and therefore most models are not sophisticated enough to give accurate answers, if 
even probabilistic ones.50  
The profits arising from R&D are wide-ranging, as they consist of primary, secondary and 
tertiary effects. Firstly, new and improved products and processes may be discovered. Secondly, 
research may provide for the continuity of programs, improved capability for recruiting 
scientists and research engineers, as well as increased organizational capabilities. Finally, 
research is also an investment to the future value of the whole company, while also the 
employment for highly trained people is always secured.51 Although the profits gained from 
R&D can be seen as very complex and wide-ranging as they extend all the way to the society, 
and the actual return on investment in numbers of R&D may be impossible to calculate 
accurately, evidence can be presented on the effects of R&D to corporate growth and its direct 
relation to the non-rivalry and network attributes of intangibles.52  
Lev (2001) discusses a study performed in 1980-99 in 83 publicly traded chemical companies to 
measure the return on R&D to the investing companies. Statistical estimation was used to 
estimate the contribution of one R&D dollar to the income of physical assets and of brands. 
The contribution was analysed by evaluating the R&D dollars spent to operating income in 
that year and the operating incomes of the two subsequent decades, as successful R&D projects 
have long-term impact on profitability of the company. The following results were gained from 
the research:  
- One invested R&D dollar increases current and future operating income by an average 
of two dollars. Conclusively, the annual before tax ROI of chemical R&D would be 27 
per cent, or ≈17 per cent after taxes.  
- The weighted average cost of capital in most chemical companies (in the US) is 8-10 per 
cent, therefore indicating an annual cost-benefit differential of about 7 per cent of 
R&D.  
- High economies of scale exist in chemical R&D, i.e. ROI increases with investment.  
- Return on chemical R&D is above-cost-of-capital, while physical assets and advertising 
expenses generate only an average return.  
- Chemical R&D prospects are fully appreciated by investors.53  
 
50 Hounshell (1998), p. 6-7 
51 Hounshell (1998), p. 10-13 
52 Lev (2001), p. 51 
53 Lev (2001), p. 53-54 
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If we assume that pharmaceutical companies belong to chemical companies, we could note that 
if ROI does indeed rise with investment, then the R&D of pharmaceuticals is relatively high as 
drug R&D expenses are known to be high. As this return on investment would also most 
probably be affected by compulsory licensing then it should also be remunerated according to 
the differential.  
Another study to evaluate the R&D contribution to the growth of businesses was realized in 
1970-1980 by relating a performance measure such as profits and sales statistically to R&D 
expenditures while controlling for the effects of other investments on the business’ growth. 
However, the primary problem with the level of accuracy of this method is that research 
projects may last for decades and hence the investment in R&D may take a long time to 
generate sales, which on the other hand are often  at least to some extent unknown. Moreover, 
the profit and sales figures may be coloured by biases and distortions as companies wish to 
manage investors’ perceptions.54 Of course the returns on long-term research are also much less 
certain than on short-term research with project specific investments. If the result of research 
lies in the unknown future, the only certainty is that without the research the company will not 
stay competitive.55 Nonetheless, the study suggested that basic research has a much higher rate 
of return on R&D concerning corporate productivity and growth than other types of R&D. 
One reason for this is that basic research has a much higher risk than applied R&D, but does 
not come close to explaining the whole truth.56 Then again the results of the study suggesting 
that basic research is more profitable than applied research might include some inaccuracy, as a 
result of the time lag in generation of profits in long-term research.  
Yet others believe that stock prices and returns provide adequate information on company 
value and performance, which in turn means that R&D contribution can be assessed using 
market values while patents provide yet an additional signal of the company’s R&D and 
technology. This is however somewhat contradictory to investor actions, as stock prices are 
positively affected by corporate announcements of new R&D projects.57 Therefore the mere 
initiation of a research project raises stock prices hence increasing the value of the company’s 
R&D. At this point, however, the actual results, if any, of the research are yet to be discovered. 
Also, it is important to acknowledge that although important it is not the mere research that 
generates profits, but also technical capabilities, market knowledge, marketing expertise and 
manufacturing capabilities are needed for the final results.58 
 
54 Lev (2001), p. 55-57 
55 Hounshell (1998), p. 13 
56 Lev (2001), p. 57 
57 Lev (2001), p. 57-58 
58 Hounshell (1998), p. 15 
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Patents are the asset traded most often, through licensing and sales. The amount of royalty 
income is also constantly increasing. Moreover, it seems that investors value a royalty dollar  
two to three times higher than that of regular income. The reason for the high valuation may be 
that of income stability, as patents are usually licensed for several years. However, patent 
royalties also affect investors’ valuation of the company’s R&D. Companies’ R&D is valuated 
relatively higher, if their patents are licensed. It may be that investors believe the quality and 
prospects of companies being able to license are relatively higher. Consequently R&D 
contributes to the productivity, growth and capital market value of a company.59 This would 
suggest that the amount of royalties paid in compulsory licensing has an effect on the valuation 
of the company’s R&D as well as investor interest. Hence, this could mean that compulsory 
licensing could indeed benefit the company, if royalties were deemed high.  
A study performed by Scherer in 1977 suggests that company R&D expenditure is 36 per cent 
higher with companies under compulsory licensing in comparison to unaffected companies in 
the same industry. Company sales were also taken into account. Moreover, he found that first-
mover advantages are weighted by companies, as important as patents, if not even of higher 
importance. First-mover advantages function as a non-patent barrier to imitation, while 
companies may earn excessive profits and enjoy low costs during their head-start. The 
companies perceived by consumers as the pioneers of a certain product will also enjoy trust and 
reputation, which in turn provides the possibility of large market shares and premium prices. 
Moreover, imitators often have to spend a relatively equal amount to research and 
development, but not being able to enjoy as large market shares.60 This applies especially to 
consumer goods, but also in most markets where first-mover advantage is valued higher than 
patent protection.  
The same does not however apply tomedicine patents. The first-mover inventing a medicine 
patent is usually found to spend over € 270 million (exchange rate of 26.8.2011; USD 400 
million) for the early stages of research, such as early screening tests and animal tests. Then at 
the next stage full-scale controlled tests of the surviving molecules in human beings are carried 
out. The objective of such expenditures is to identify useful molecules and then prove their 
effectiveness in aiding people safely. This proven, the evidence on efficacy becomes public 
knowledge for all to see. Without medicine patents imitators would have to spend only a few 
million to devise their own production methods to “cheap-ride” on the pioneer’s invention.61 
Also the production of a generic compound only takes a few years. In most countries generic 
compounds receive market registration simply by showing their bio-equivalence to the 
pioneering brand. In all, the production of generic medicines is very profitable as market 
 
59 Lev (2001), p. 61 
60 Scherer (2010), p. 22; DiMasi et al. (2003) 
61 Scherer (2010), p. 22 
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approval is achieved in a short time, hence being able to enter the market very soon after the 
expiration of the pioneering patent.62  Therefore, it can be assumed that in pharmaceutical 
companies with compulsory licensed products the R&D expenditure is not 36 per cent higher, 
but rather lower than it would be without the compulsory licensing.  
Silberston and Taylor (1971) demanded English company officials to evaluate the effects on 
R&D expenditures if a worldwide compulsory licensing regime at “reasonable” royalties was 
constituted. The weighted average effect was 8 per cent in all industries, except for 
pharmaceuticals, where a negative impact of 64 per cent was predicted.63 In 1981-1983 Edwin 
Mansfield, on the other hand, interviewed 100 US company R&D executives on the number of 
inventions that would not have been developed without patent protection. Most industries 
reported a prediction of 14 per cent decrease, while the pharmaceutical industry estimated a 
decrease of 60 per cent.64 Finally Levin et al. (1987) had a sample of 650 US R&D executives to 
resolve the effectiveness of first-mover advantages in appropriating benefits from new products. 
On average 130 industries patents were deemed less effective than superior sales or service 
efforts. However, in pharmaceutical firms patent protection was named as the most important 
or equally important to the most important method in the accrual of benefits.65 
In conclusion, the assessment of research is possible, but flexibility is necessary for the 
unanticipated achievements, while the assessment in itself is very burdensome. Within the 
chemical industry it is a common dilemma whether the value of basic research can be captured, 
as evolving results may be minor or take years to come upon.66 In pharmaceutical research the 
largest problem is very likely the allocation of costs. Medicine research may take decades, during 
which projects are initiated and terminated. The problem then is to assess to which degree each 
project has contributed to the invention of the final product. In consideration of compulsory 
licensing, however, the patented drug is already on the market, and has been issued with a 
specific price. In determining a royalty fee it would then be within the court’s discretion to 
evaluate whether the patent owner has already valuated the research having led to the patent 
and product, and then incorporated it into the product price, or not.  
 
62 Grabowski (2002), p. 852 
63 See Scherer (2010), p. 22 
64 Mansfield (1986), p. 175-176 
65 Levin et al. (1987), p. 796 
66 Jasinski (1998), p. 39-41 
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3.3 Compensating the Value of a Medicine Patent  
One of the underlying reasons for governments to grant patents is that of information 
publicity. Patents are granted so that the underlying information  becomes public and that 
other people can then do their best to improve the invention. Some companies have very weak 
patent policies, meaning that their patents are not interlinked well, therefore making them easy 
to use by others for improving them or infringing them. One could say that such weak patent 
policies realize the underlying meaning of patent protection. However,on the other hand, there 
are companies with very strong patent positions. Such companies have many patents, which are 
incredibly intertwined, making it very difficult to penetrate  that technology.67  
Rozek (2000), for example, feels that only market forces should be allowed to have an effect on 
the terms of agreements. According to him, the role of the government is not to decide, which 
patents should be licensed and on what terms. Therefore, governments or courts should not 
have a say in the amount of royalties paid for licensing, or the licensing for that matter. The 
mere function of the government would be to provide the legal framework for such 
negotiations and the enforcement of contracts, including adequate antitrust and consumer 
protection laws.68 However, the question then arises, what the function of the government 
would be in cases of violation of these laws. Hence, it could be stated that two different 
situations of compensation should exist in compulsory licensing: 1) cases where compulsory 
licensing is imposed, because of social or other such reasons, and 2) cases where compulsory 
licensing is imposed as a penalty for violating existing legislation. Compensation methods 
would perhaps then have to differ between the two, i.e. in one market forces should be used to 
determine the justifiable amount of compensation, while in the latter, it would be left to the 
court’sdiscretion.  
Compulsory licensing does not usually specify the form of license to be used, but rather states 
the requirement of a “reasonable” royalty or as in the TRIPS of an “adequate” remuneration. 
As previously noted, there can be many different consequences of compulsory licensing. These 
consequences, however, depend, inter alia, on the licensing agreement’s form. Consequently, 
the assessment of compulsory licensing is difficult and case specific. Some possible forms of 
licensing are a fixed-fee license, a license that achieves coordinated production, and a license 
with a sales-correlated royalty. If the royalty rate of a sales-correlated royalty is small, then the 
economic effects are relatively same as with fixed-fee licenses, which have a royalty rate of zero, 
where the fixed fee is only a transfer of wealth between licensor and licensee, hence having no 
consequence on economic surplus.69  
 
67 Narin (1998), p.71 
68 Rozek (2000), p. 891 
69 Gilbert and Shapiro (1996), p.  12753 
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In compulsory licensing a fixed-fee would lower welfare even in the short run, if the licensee has 
high costs in the absence of the license, as well as relatively high costs with the license in 
relation to the costs of the licensor. Such a case would exist when the license is essential for the 
licensee to compete in the market. However, the license would not make the licensee a very 
efficient competitor. Even a royalty-free license could therefore harm economic efficiency by 
easing the entry of a high-cost company. Coordinated production, on the other hand, is an 
optimal method of licensing, if the two parties together can earn better profits than on their 
own. In such licensing, production levels are coordinated and deviation from them may result 
in a penalty, if so agreed. Such licensing may in the short run achieve more efficient 
production. However, this method is not usable in compulsory licensing, and in fact, the threat 
of compulsory licensing may in such licensing cases lower welfare. The parties have a natural 
incentive to deliver a license agreement, but the threat of compulsory licensing may provide the 
licensee with a method to gain more favourable terms of licensing.70  
As mentioned earlier, in the pharmaceutical industry the licensor is in fact the party with the 
highest costs, while the licensee needs to invest a relatively small amount to take up production 
of the licensed product. This would suggest that, ceteris paribus, a fixed-fee license, or sales 
correlated royalty with a small rate, would in the short term enhance welfare. This conclusion is 
however quite a simplification, and needs to be taken with reservation. 
The remuneration for a patent’s compulsory license may be considered adequate as long as it 
safeguards the legitimate interests of the patent owner. The adequacy of remunerations should 
also always be guided by the specific circumstances of each case. If the compulsory licensing is 
used for the restoring of the competitive environment or to meet a pubic need, this should be 
taken into account when deciding on the adequacy of the remuneration. The TRIPS 
Agreement even suggests that if compulsory licensing is used to remedy anti-competitive acts, 
the remuneration should be set apart from the regular level of commercial remuneration, so as 
to reflect its corrective or punitive nature. This would mean that in some cases adequate (and 
reasonable) remuneration could be zero, if competitive conditions wish to be restored.71  
Some think that the adequate remuneration should be based on the economic value of the 
patent, i.e. the potential value for the patent owner. This economic value could then be used as 
a benchmark, which is discounted by certain factors, as previously discussed. Then again, a few 
feel that although the economic value may be taken into account, the remuneration does not 
need to be based on this value, while others think that the remuneration should be based 
exactly on the amount of actual or potential financial income the licensee gains with the 
license. Another possibility would be to calculate adequate remunerations in the same manner 
 
70 Gilbert and Shapiro (1996), p. 12752-3 
71 Taubman (2008), p. 953-954 
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as commercial damages in infringement cases, which in the TRIPS is stated as ‘damages adequate 
to compensate for the injury’ that has been caused by a certain infringement.72  However, yet again 
arises the question whether compulsory licenses can be compared to infringements. The 
damages awarded in infringement cases are in fact a penalty for the infringer, as well as a 
compensation for the patent holder of course. Therefore, it somehow does not seem logical that 
a “penalty” of such would be deemed to the licensee when the government or court has indeed 
provided the license.  
Taubman (2008) concludes his analysis of the TRIPS Agreement ‘adequate remuneration’ for 
compulsory licensing by stating that remuneration is adequate if it reasonably compensates for 
any conflict with the regular exploitation of the patent, as well as for any prejudice of legitimate 
interests.73 This interpretation would also allow for a punitive approach in cases where 
compulsory licensing is used as a penalty for anti-competitive measures. Similarly, the use of 
discount factors is possible to reflect humanitarian or public sector uses.74 Consequently, the 
value of the patent is an important basis for the evaluation of the remuneration, and anti-
competitive issues need to be taken into account, as well as social issues. Moreover, the 
licensee’s financial gains should also be taken into consideration, which would suggest a sales-
correlated royalty. The problem, however, persists on how to move from theory to reality, from 
words to numbers.  
4 1+1=2 
It has now been demonstrated that compulsory licensing is a very complicated issue with many 
different faces. It has also been noted, that the issues to consider when determining a royalty in 
compulsory licensing are various. Figure 1 below demonstrates the interconnection of licenses, 
prices, R&D and market effects. Although the figure describes the market for technology, the 
basic idea is the same for pharmaceuticals. The economic effects are of even more importance 
with pharmaceuticals than with technology, but as the figure does not measure extent, it is 
irrelevant here. 
 
72 Taubman (2008), p. 956; TRIPS, Article 45 
73 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
74 Taubman (2008), p. 957 
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Figure 1 Linkages between the conditions in the market for technology and economic outcomes75 
 
Both, search and transaction costs, as well as other production costs, and license fees affect the 
price of the product sold. The R&D expenditures invested to the product by the patent owner 
are at least to some extent incorporated into the price of the pharmaceutical. A licensee, 
independent of whether as a result of a voluntary or compulsory license, also incorporates its 
production costs, as well as the licensing fees payable to the patent owner, to the product price. 
According to basic economic theories price is determined by demand and supply of a product, 
and generally demand decreases as prices rise. This again is reflected in the GNP. The demand 
for pharmaceuticals is, however, quite inelastic, and price does not have such a large impact on 
the demand, hence the effect of spending on pharmaceuticals stays relatively constant, 
assuming ceteris paribus.  The largest effect on national welfare and growth would therefore be 
through the spending of pharmaceutical companies, i.e. spending on research and 
development. Consequently, another arrow could be added to Aoki and Schiff’s Figure 
pointing from search and transaction costs to national welfare. Also, another balloon should be 
added in the final row to indicate employment.  
Patent legislation has evidently a large impact on pharmaceutical companies’ spending, R&D 
employment, as well as, employment in general in the pharmaceutical industry, and foreign 
direct investment. Italy and Canada are good examples of the effects of patent legislation and 
compulsory licensing on national economic issues. It is often stated that patent laws prevent 
access to medicine, and that therefore compulsory licensing should be promoted, and 
preferably with low royalties. The truth is that even with reasonable royalties to be paid as 
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remuneration for compulsory licensing, if realized at a large scale, a 64 per cent decrease in 
research and development expenditures could result. The assumption that compulsory licensing 
does not affect innovation incentives is correct in almost all other industries, as the effect of a 
compulsory licensing regime is predicted at an 8 per cent decrease of innovation. Similarly, 60 
per cent of medicine inventions would not exist without patent protection. Most industries also 
valuate first-mover advantage as more important than patents, which is the first priority  for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
Since the effects of the patent legislation and its exceptions are so deeply inflicting to the society 
and economy as a whole, it becomes clear that the calculation of royalties in compulsory 
licensing of medicine patents is not of the easiest sort. It is not simply the value of the patent to 
be taken into consideration, or the value of research and development, but also the objectives 
of the compulsory licenses have great weight. However, in order to maintain pharmaceutical 
companies’ incentive to innovate even with the existence of the threat of compulsory licensing, 
the basis for every royalty calculation is the value of the patent. Through calculating patent 
citations various studies have concluded that pharmaceutical patents often have more than 20 
citations per patent, and hence have 54 per cent market value premium for companies. The 
number of citations is therefore one method of valuating a patent, but in the case of 
compulsory licensing the aforementioned time lag may be problematic.  
Three different valuation methods were defined in this study. Those were the income, market 
and cost approach. It was noted that all of the three have some problems when applying to the 
valuation of pharmaceutical patents. With the market approach the biggest problem is that of 
finding a comparable for the patent to be compulsorily licensed. As the market approach works 
best for commodities, we will now eliminate it as a possible valuation method of 
pharmaceutical patents. The cost approach, on the other hand, determines various different 
costs that could be used to valuate a patent. With pharmaceutical patents, the least inaccurate 
would most probably be that of transaction cost. This would then mean that the value of the 
patent would be as much as it costs to produce a new medicine that can generate the same ROI. 
It is near to impossible to predict the costs of producing the next cash cow for the company, 
because it may take for two decades. The closest prediction would be to say that it will be more 
than 270 million Euros, and of course this is not the transaction cost of a specific patent, but a 
general estimate resulting from various studies. It seems clear that the income approach is 
closest to our demands.  
The income approach demands for the identification of the intangible asset, an estimation of 
expected cash flows and the assignment of an appropriate risk for the prediction. Then by using 
the formula NPV= C0 + ∑ Ct/(1+rt)
t  the net present value (NPV) of the patent could be 
realized. The initial cash flow in this formula would for the most part be research and 
development costs and of course, those of launching and advertisement expenses. This in turn 
makes the valuation of R&D important.  
One invested R&D dollar increases current and future operating income by an average of two 
dollars, while the mere initiation of a research project raises stock prices of the pharmaceutical 
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company, hence increasing the value of the company’s R&D. However, all research cannot be 
valuated equally. Basic research has a much higher rate of return on R&D concerning 
corporate productivity and growth than other types of R&D. Moreover, also the licensing of 
patents has an effect on the value of R&D as investors valuate licensed patents relatively higher. 
As a result R&D contributes to the productivity, growth and capital market value of the 
company. 
In order to use the income approach the aforementioned would therefore be the most 
important factors to take into consideration. In addition in the discount rate at least the 
opportunity cost of investing in the specific drug instead of another medicine would have to be 
taken into account. The threat of compulsory licensing of course then increases the discount 
rate, if another medicine would not have faced the same threat.  
Even if the value of a patent would be calculated as relatively low, and this calculation used as 
the basis for determining the royalty in compulsory licensing, other factors must be taken into 
consideration as well. As mentioned, the fee that the licensee has to pay is reflected onto the 
price of the medicine. If the royalty is low, then the price of the pharmaceutical will be lower, 
and most likely decrease from the pre-compulsory license price. This will increase the 
probability of parallel trade to higher priced countries. Patent owner companies are keen on 
controlling such trade very closely, but are not able to do so when the supplier is a licensee.   
It therefore starts to become obvious that the calculation of royalties in compulsory licensing 
should be divided into two different situations:  
1. Compulsory licensing used to resolve social or other such issues, and 
2. Compulsory licensing used as a penalty for violating existing legislation.  
Although in the first scenario, the objective of the compulsory license will in most cases be that 
of lowering the price of the drug, the royalties should not be deemed too low in order to 
prevent parallel trade, decrease of incentive to innovate, as well as the decrease of economic 
growth and employment. The more often compulsory licensing is used for social matters 
without adequate remuneration, the more relevant the potential ill effects of compulsory 
licensing become.  
On the other hand, in situations where compulsory licensing is used as penalty, royalties of 
course can be lower in order to actually realize the effect of a penalty. Moreover, if in fact 
deemed as a penalty for illegal actions then the license and low royalty could be better justified, 
hence the incentive to innovate might not be threathened.  However, in such cases it must be 
taken into consideration that investors indeed value a royalty dollar to two to three times 
higher than that of regular income. The reason for the high valuation may be that of income 
stability, which of course is equally stabile in cases of compulsory license. Therefore, it must be 
kept in mind that even if the royalty is low, the pharmaceutical company might be winning in 
other areas, as for example with a rising stock price.  
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In conclusion, remuneration can be calculated by basing it on the economic value of the 
patent, which is then discounted by certain factors76, by taking the economic value into account 
but not using it as a basis, or on the value that the patent generates to the licensee. However, 
another possibility would be to calculate adequate remunerations in the same manner as 
commercial damages in infringement cases, which in the TRIPS Agreement is stated as 
‘damages adequate to compensate for the injury’ that has been caused by a certain 
infringement. It is however, a relevant issue whether a compulsory license can be considered as 
equal to an infringement. The action and the effects are relevantly same, the only difference 
being that one is legal and the other is not. Hence the damages awarded in infringement cases 
are in fact a penalty for the infringer and a compensation for the patent holder. Therefore, 
especially in situations where compulsory licensing is used as a penalty for illegal actions, it 
seems illogical to “compensate” the patent owner.  
Which ever manner is chosen for determining the royalties paid for compulsory licenses, it 
must be kept in mind that the pharmaceutical industry does not function as any other industry; 
legislation and all actions have tremendous effects that are inflicted deep into the economy, the 
patents and their exclusivity are valued very high by their owners while research and 
development has its very own value to be calculated.Most of all,  even with a compulsory license 
the patent owner can still continue to produce, sell and advertise its product, and hence 
constantly generate profits.  
For future development of this study, it would be profitable to analyse the financial data of 
pharmaceutical companies that have experienced compulsory licensing, as well as of those 
generic companies having been awarded  such licenses. Such data could provide with important 
information on the actual effects of compulsory licenses on both the licensor and the licensee. 
Moreover, the analysis of existing case law compared to the financial data would be prosperous. 
As a final note, it should be taken into account that much of the literature used in this study is 
based on information concerning the US market. Although this has been taken into account 
when arriving to conclusions, there may still exist a systematic error as a result of using such 
information in consideration of the EU markets. 
  
 
76 Here note that in the income approach the discount rate is calculated already when evaluating the economic 
value of the patent. 
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